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The ability to make product variations and to respond to 
demand fluctuations as well as to changing market needs is said 
to be one of the key issues behind the competitive power of a 
modern company. Thus economies of scope -- or simply flexibility 
-- are usually believed to be one of the driving forces behind 
modern production automation, such as FWS and other forms of CIM. 
They are, of course, technological means of creating flexibility 
in production and design. 
In the literature economies of scope or flexibility are 
usually described either in terms of business strategy or in very 
general economic ternlrs. The latter type of studies are directly 
connected to technology and to technological and organizational 
design of flexible production. What is missing is a real 
economic theory of flexibility, which could explain costs and 
benefits and the relationships between different inputs and 
outputs. One of the aims of the CIM projects has been to develop 
a cost-benefit model to acquire an understanding of the economic 
factors of flexibility. 
The clothing industry is a typical case, where the ability 
to make variations and to respond to seasonal fluctuations in 
demand is a critical factor for a successful company. Therefore, 
the ability to make new designs and to implement them rapidly in 
the production process are of crucial importance. Thus, design 
systems as well as production automation have been essential for 
the clothing industry in the industrialized countries. 
One of the main sectors to be studied by the Finnish TES- 
program is the clothing industry. It is also one main focus of 
the bilateral cooperation between the Finnish and Bulgarian TES- 
programs. 
Dr. Geoffrey Wyatt, from the Heriot-Watt University, UK, has 
prepared a research report for the Finnish TES-program, which 
explains the sources of flexibility in the clothing industry as 
well as the organizational and technological means of achieving 
flexibility. The paper is also a starting point for an 
understanding of flexibility and especially of design as an 
economic production factor. It is highly relevant to the IIASA 
CIM Project. 
Prof. Jukka Ranta 
Proj ect Leader 
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1. Introduction 
Apart from being an important determinant of general living standards, the 
state of technology determines many important features of the economy, such 
as the cost of transforming inputs of factors of productions into output, and 
the extent of substitution between outputs and between inputs. It also 
strongly influences the demand for factors of production, the location of 
production and the appropriate economic organization of the industry. When 
technology changes, therefore, there is a substantial catalogue of economic 
consequences to be anticipated. 
This essay attempts to provide a framework for a coherent discussion of 
the economic effects that might be expected to follow from impending 
changes in technology used in the clothing industry. Needless to say, it is not 
possible to discuss the details of the technologies and changes in technology 
as well as their economic effects. Instead, these are given a rather broad- 
brush treatment in the account that follows. It will also soon be apparent 
that the economic effects of certain supposed broad changes in technology 
can only be sketched out as speculations of a rather general type at this 
stage. Rather, what the essay attempts to contribute is a drawing-together 
of various strands of economic analysis that appear to have particular 
relevance to the topic in hand. 
The initial intention was to focus on only one element of changing 
technology: namely that affecting the design function within the industry. It 
soon became apparent that such a restricted view would distort the overall 
picture, and that in any event the changes in technology come as a package, 
so that focussing on design alone would be misleading. Even so, there is still 
a certain residual emphasis on design in the paper, and this hopefully reflects 
its pivotal role in the clothing industry. It will be argued that product 
differentiation is the essence of the clothing industry, and design of course is 
all about the creation of such differentiated products. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the economic 
structure of the clothing industry, emphasising the role of technology in 
determining its structure, and pointing to the kinds of changes that new 
technology is expected to bring to the industry in the foreseeable future. 
Section 3 is a self-contained account of a simple economic model of the firm 
in which design is treated explicitly as a decision variable. Section 4 
concentrates on the industrial organisation of product-differentiated 
industries, and relates the theoretical analysis to the clothing industry where 
possible. Finally Section 5 presents an outline of what might be predicted 
for the clothing industry on the basis of the foregoing analysis. 
2. The clothing industry 
The clothing industry is rather vulnerable to cyclical fluctuations in 
income, and in the prices of its material inputs. This could be thought 
surprising since clothing, along with food and shelter, is often designated as 
a necessity, a t  least when all clothing types are lumped together and treated 
as a single "commodity". Such a designation suggests rather low income and 
price elasticities of demand for clothing, taken as a whole, which in turn 
imply that the industry should be somewhat insensitive to cyclical 
fluctuations. There are, however, a t  least two reasons why this is not so. 
First, clothing is a semi-durable commodity, and the demand facing the 
industry represents the sum of replacements and additions to the stock held 
by consumers. Although consumers' demand for the flow of services from 
their stock of clothing assets may respond inelastically to fluctuations in its 
underlying determinants, the semi-durable nature of clothing amplifies and 
bunches the response in time as far as it concerns the effective demand that 
producers face for their output. Added to this, the second reason for the 
proneness of the industry to cyclical fluctuations is that a large and variable 
fraction of the stock of clothing held by consumers is prone to obsolescence 
as a result of changes in fashion. Despite the fact that the demand for 
fashion can to a degree be explained by economic variables (Stigler and 
Becker, 1977), changes in fashion are difficult to predict. However, 
predicting such changes on a year-by-year basis - or on an even shorter time 
horizon - is one of the major tasks of the designers who define the products 
which the industry produces. 
2.1 The structure of the traditional clothing industry 
Where a significant clothing industry exists in a market economy, it is 
highly fragmented. Typically, around three-quarters of plants have 50 
employees or less, and only one in a hundred has over 1000 employees (Rush 
and Hoffmann, 1987). This structure is essentially determined by the 
technological characteristics of the industry's products and production. The 
products are extremely heterogeneous and the production process is 
remarkably homogeneous. The product heterogeneity is partly intrinsic - 
reflecting combinations of different garments, shapes and sizes - and partly 
due to the demand for variety or individuality that typifies the product 
("Kleider machen Leute"). The homogeneity of the production process is due 
to the fact that it is organised around a simple and stable technology that 
has for many years been the least cost form of production irrespective of 
factor prices - namely the sewing-machine/operator workstation. Scale 
economies in production are almost negligible with this traditional technology, 
and entry costs are extremely low - indeed part of the industry competes 
with household production of essentially the same goods using essentially the 
same technology. 
The organisation of activities within firms in the clothing industry is more 
or less standardised. It can be described as a sequence of stages following 
an annual or seasonal cycle. The first stage in the process is the design of 
the made-up products, which in turn gives rise to a plan for the purchase of 
raw materials, production and eventual marketing. The first stage, design, 
includes not only the conception of the products, but also the creation of 
prototypes and of templates in the subsequent pre-production activities of 
"grading" and "marking". Grading is the process of adjusting the master 
patterns to the various sizes that will be produced, while marking involves 
the fitting together of the graded patterns on the cloth in preparation for 
cutting. The production process involves a sequence of cutting, sewing and 
finishing activities. Cutting is normally done in batches, and here there are 
considerable possibilities for substitution between capital and labour. The 
traditional sewing activity has allowed little scope for substitution between 
capital and labour, being organised around the sewing-machine/operator 
workstation, as already indicated. But, over time, advances in technology 
have led to faster and more productive sewing machines becoming available, 
so that it might not be unreasonable to characterise the sewing production 
function as one which has exhibited zero substitution possibilities a t  a 
moment of time, but with labour-saving technical progress taking place over 
time. The final element of the production process, finishing, is an activity 
that requires highly skilled labour. 
These observations about the production process may help to explain 
trends in the international organisation of the industry. Thus in countries 
where wages are high relative to the cost of capital, firms have an incentive 
to invest in cutting machines with high throughputs, while in low wage 
countries cutting might be done predominantly by hand. I f ,  as mentioned 
above, the sewing function does not allow much substitution between capital 
and labour, and if the cost of capital is similar in different countries - which 
is increasingly the case as international capital markets have become free of 
restrictions - then sewing is more efficiently carried out in countries with 
low wages. Indeed, because of the preponderance of sewing in total costs, it 
has been the case for many years that the most competitive producers are 
found in low wage countries. 
These are the underlying forces which have led to the substantial changes 
that have taken place in the international location of the industry over the 
last half century or so. Relative factor prices have been favourable to 
clothing manufacture in the less developed countries, and the location of 
activities has changed to reflect this changing competitiveness. As the 
clothing industry in developed (OECD) countries has become less and less 
price competitive, so its survival has depended more and more on 'non-price 
factors' such as quality and design. At the same time there have been 
strenuous efforts by the developed countries to cushion the necessary 
adjustment of their industries by the implementation of various protectionist 
policies, of which the most internationally comprehensive is the multi-fibre 
agreement of the GATT. Even so, the trend in competitiveness has been 
reflected in a recent tendency for clothing firms in Europe and North 
America to do the design and finishing at home but subcontract the middle 
stages of manufacture to partners in more competitive locations, such as the 
Far East. As would be expected, this trend has been particularly strong at 
the "low end" of the market. 
As far as the industrial organisation of the clothing industry is concerned, 
it seems reasonably accurate to describe the clothing industry as being 
composed of multi-product firms in monopolistic competition. Usually, 
however, it is assumed that monopolistically competitive firms produce just a 
single product. The essence of monopolistic competition is that the products 
of these firms are differentiated in some way from each other. A summary 
of the theory of monopolistic competition for the purposes of this paper is 
presented in Section 4 (multi-product firms are considered in 4.3). 
2.2 New technology and the emerging clothing industry 
The new technology under consideration here is that arising from the 
electronic "information revolution" which encompasses computers, robotics, 
communications and so on. More specifically, when it is applied in 
manufacturing contexts, it assumes various forms, each with its own acronym. 
Thus we have "computer aided design" (CAD), "computer aided manufacturing" 
(CAM), "computer integrated manufacturing" (CIM), "flexible manufacturing 
systems" (FMS), "just in time" (JIT) delivery systems, and so on. 
The clothing industry has not been to the forefront in the adoption of 
such new technologies, and for good reasons. The new technologies were 
applied initially to those areas of manufacturing where they were most 
likely to be profitable - that is to say, where the benefits anticipated from 
their application were large and/or the costs of development were small. 
The latter consideration has in practice been dominant because of the truism 
that solutions to simpler problems are found earlier - and indeed may be 
required as inputs into the solutions of more difficult problems. Thus there 
has been, in the application of these new technologies, a "learning by doing" 
phenomenon on a grand (industrial) scale. Hence the initial applications of 
the new technologies were to industries in which the problems were both 
reasonably standard, implying large markets for solutions, and relatively 
straightforward, implying a low cost to produce them. 
Thus CAD found early application in the electronics and the building and 
civil engineering industries, followed by metal-using manufacturing industries 
such as cars and shipbuilding. The common feature of these industries is 
that the geometry of design is reasonably straightforward, largely because the 
products are made from rigid materials, and the uses to which the products 
are put are relatively well-defined. The same factors led to the initial 
implementation of numerically controlled machine tools in the metal-working 
industries already in the 1960s, while the more recent integration of such 
automated cutting and assembly with CAD techniques at the design stage is 
an important part of what is understood by "computer integrated 
manufacturing". 
The clothing industry has presented various difficulties for the application 
of these new technologies. Perhaps the main one is that the materials it 
uses are soft and pliable. But additional problems are that "shape" is 
difficult to pin down (!) in simple geometric terms, and that an essential yet 
difficult-to-describe aspect of clothing concerns how it moves and how it 
allows the wearer to move. Nevertheless, some aspects of clothing 
production have already been automated in some firms - notably the pre- 
assembly activities involving grading, marking and cutting, where the principal 
gains are in the utilization of materials (Rush and Hoffmann, 1987). It can, 
moreover, be argued that the clothing industry will soon be in a position to 
make further innovations involving the new technologies. As an example, it 
appears that the potential exists to relate a customer's exact measurements, 
themselves produced by an electronic imaging system, to the appropriate cut 
of the garment (Bell, 1987). 
An area of application of the new technologies in which, it is argued, 
there is substantial scope for the application of innovations based on the new 
technologies is in the integration of the design and pre-production stages, 
where "design" includes not only the specification of the product but also the 
specification and scheduling of the production process. As Rush and 
Hoffrnann point out, design and pre-production are the most "information 
intensive" stages, and are therefore crucial to the overall automation of 
production (op. cit.). It seems that the impending changes in technology at 
this stage of the firm's activities are likely to be quite radical and 
substantial. In contrast, there have been fairly steady improvements in the 
productivity of the sewing process due to the introduction of faster and more 
flexible machinery, and this trend of incremental innovation in sewing is 
likely to continue. However, the latest manifestation of such improvements 
is the appearance of "intelligent" sewing-machine workstations, in which the 
machine is capable of "learning" a sequence of operations by copying those of 
its operator-tutor. This seems to be a change in the pattern of technical 
progress experienced hitherto, specialising it from being labour-saving in a 
general sense to becoming particularly "skill-saving" in character. It means 
that one skilled operator can, in effect, now operate a number of machines, 
each one of which is supervised by a relatively unskilled attendant. I f  it is 
accurate to portray low-wage third-world countries as having abundant raw 
labour, but scarce skilled labour, then this innovation confers particular 
advantages on such countries, and would help to reverse the trend of 
labour-saving technical change which has been eroding their competitive 
advantage. 
3. A simple economic theory of design and the firm 
Design is an activity of the firm that impinges on both its revenues and 
its costs. Increased design effort aimed at  the specification of the product 
should shift the demand function outwards: by improving the product, or 
making it more suitable for consumers, a larger quantity should be sold at  
any given price (or a higher price charged for any particular quantity 
supplied). But at  the same time a greater design effort will affect the 
firm's cost function. One question of some importance in the sequel is 
whether the design effort affects variable costs as well as fixed costs (with 
respect to output). In general it will, and it could do so in either direction: 
upward or downward. The cost of the design effort itself adds directly to 
fixed costs, but to the extent that design is aimed a t  the production process, 
for a given product specification, it should reduce total costs - although how 
that splits between fixed and variable costs cannot be said a priori. 
Denoting the quantity demanded by q, the design effort by d and the 
price of output by p, the inverse demand function facing the firm can be 
written: 
p = p(d, q) with p, < 0 
while the firm's cost function is: 
C = C(d, q) with C, > 0 and C, > 0 
in which C is total cost and q here represents the firm's output, which is 
equal to the quantity demanded. The partial derivatives are standard, but in 
addition we need to consider how the variable d affects the two functions. It 
would be natural to assume that p, > 0, implying that the product is improved 
in the eyes of consumers. But if design is focused on saving costs, i t  could 
be that the quality of the product is impaired, reducing demand so that 
p, < 0. However, a profit maximising firm will not be in equilibrium if an 
increment in design effort both reduces costs (C, < 0) and increases demand 
(p, > 0) - because it should increase its design activity in that circumstance 
until the sum of the incremental effects is zero, which can only happen if 
one of the effects is reversed. 
The firm considers the impact of design on both - its demand and its cost 
functions, and chooses q and d so as to maximise profit: 
rr = q.~(d,q) - C(d,q). 
The first order conditions imply the following equalities: 
P + q*p, = c, (1  
q*pd = C d  ( 2 )  
in which (1)  is the usual equality between marginal revenue and marginal 
cost, and where the partial derivatives in ( 2 )  must have the same sign in 
equilibrium - the point made above. These equations apply to competitive 
firms and firms with market power alike. Firms in a competitive equilibrium 
face an infinitely elastic demand for their product, so that p, = 0 in ( I ) ,  
implying that price equals marginal cost, while by definition the firm with 
monopoly power faces a finite elasticity of demand (p, < 01, implying a lower 
output and higher price than for the competitive firm. But a question of 
some interest is whether the design effort would differ in these two cases 
(and more generally as a function of the price elasticity of demand). This 
turns on how the equilibrium design effort varies with output. If marginal 
revenue (or, for a competitive firm, price) increases faster or decreases 
slower than marginal cost with greater design effort, then the equilibrium 
design effort increases with output, and hence competitive demand conditions 
enhance the firm's design effort (Schmalensee, 1979). 
The set-up here has some formal similarities with a well-known model of 
advertising or selling costs (Dorfman and Steiner, 1954). However, in that 
model it is normal to allow for just the direct costs of advertising, whereas 
here design has both a direct cost effect and an effect on other costs as 
well. On the other hand, if q, were set to zero we would have a model in 
which d could be interpreted as R&D effort aimed at  cost-reducing 
innovations, though normally in such models it is also assumed that marginal 
costs are constant (Cqq = 0) to reflect the fact that the long-run case is 
then most appropriate (Wyatt, 1986). 
To illustrate the meaning and implications of the various partial 
derivatives of the cost function that involve d, it is helpful to make some 
particular assumptions. For example, it could be assumed that for a given 
design effort, total cost is linear in output with fixed costs F and variable 
costs v, but both F and v are functions of design effort d, so that we may 
write: 
C = F(d) + v(d).q . 
Now consider the fixed cost element of this cost function in more detail. 
A component of these fixed costs will be the direct cost of the design 
effort, w.d, where w is the price of a unit of design resource. In addition 
there will be indirect effects of the design effort on other fixed costs, 
denoted G(d), and a component of fixed costs that is independent of d, 
denoted F,, so that: 
C = Fo + G(d) + w.d + v(d).q . (3) 
As an example, consider a firm producing made-up clothing, and suppose 
that design work has produced a basic template for some item of clothing 
and that further design activity costing w.d could reduce the amount of 
stitching and economise on material, both of which are components of 
variable costs, so v'(d) < 0. However, the cutters and sewers would have to 
learn the new steps involved (G'(d) > 01, and the product's appearance on 
the market would be delayed (p, < 0). The extra design activity would be 
undertaken as long as the reduction in variable costs exceeds the sum of the 
extra fixed costs and the loss of profit due to diminished demand. In other 
words, d increases so long as {q.p, - G'(d) - w l  > vP(d).q, until equality is 
brought about, as is required by condition (2). 
A useful expression that is derived from both the first order conditions 
(1)  and (2) is the following: 
d.Cdp.q = E (4 )  
in which E is the elasticity of price (inverse demand) with respect to design, 
which can be decomposed as the ratio of the elasticity of demand with 
respect to design (d-qdq) to the usual price elasticity of demand. Assuming 
that the firm is in production (p,q > O),  the equation implies that if design 
effort has no impact on the demand function ( E  = 01, then the firm will 
either set d to zero, ie. not have any design effort, or pursue the design 
effort until it can no longer decrease costs at the margin (C, = 0). The 
case of particular interest, of course, is where both -d and - E > 0. Assuming 
a positive design effort and finite elasticities, and using the cost function 
(31, consider the case in which G '(d) = u '(d) = 0: then only the direct costs 
of the design work affect the cost function. In that case C, = w,  and 
equation (4 )  implies that design costs as a fraction of total revenue will 
equal the elasticity E. 
Other firms' design efforts should have the effect of diverting consumers 
away, and this can be reflected in the inverse demand function by writing it 
thus: 
P = ~ ( q r  dr D) with pD < 0 
in which D represents the design efforts of rival firms. The firm's actions 
will only be affected by this if it thinks that its own decision about d will 
influence D - that is, if it has a non-zero "conjectural variation" (D,) for 
design. Now the equilibrium condition (2) above must be amended to take 
this interaction into account by including the indirect effects that work 
through the conjectural variation: 
q.(pd + PD-D~)  = C d  (2a) 
and the elasticity condition (4 )  must also reflect firms' conjectures about 
rivals' responses. Writing ED for the elasticity of inverse demand with 
respect to rivals' design efforts (D.p,Jp) and # for the conjectural elasticity 
(d.DdD ), we find: 
d.Cdp.q = E + ED.#. (4a) 
It can be seen that if the firm conjectures a null response of rivals to its 
own design efforts, so that # = 0, then (4a) specialises to (4). However, a 
belief that rivals will respond (4 > 0) will tend to reduce the right hand 
side of (4a) since E, < 0, implying a reduction in design effort. 
There is a normative question concerning the socially optimal input of 
design resources, because it can differ from that arising from profitability 
criteria. Ignoring income effects, social welfare is the sum of profits and 
consumer surplus, W = n + S where consumer surplus is: 
S(dr q) = p(d, V) dv - q.p(d, q) 
0 
and hence 
I" 
Maximising W over q and-d, the first order conditions are as follows: 
and 
Equation (5) is the standard welfare injunction that price should equal 
marginal cost, and comparison with the corresponding condition for profit 
maximisation (1) demonstrates the familiar result that a firm with market 
power charges too high a price and produces too small an output for a given 
design effort. Comparing ( 6 )  with (2) reveals that the difference is on the 
left hand side of the two equations. The comparison implies that it is how 
design shifts the whole demand curve - not just the extent of the shift at 
the profit-maximising output level - that determines whether the profit- 
making firm over- or under-supplies design. The difference in the left hand 
sides of (2) and (6) is that between the effect of more design on the 
marginal consumer and the average affect of more design on all the intra- 
marginal consumers (see Spence, 1975). If the marginal consumer values an 
increment in design less than the average intra-marginal consumer, then a 
profit oriented firm will undersupply design, given the output implied in (5). 
While there is no presumption that this is necessarily so, it may be a common 
case. 
4. Monopolistic competition and product differentiation 
Product differentiation can be horizontal or vertical. Horizontal product 
differentiation concerns the creation of different species of products 
belonging to the same general type or genus, whereas vertical product 
differentiation concerns the creation of different qualities of the same basic 
product. The meaning of quality in this context is that if two products which 
differ only in the quality dimension are on offer a t  the same price, then all 
consumers would prefer one over the other. However, the expression "product 
differentiation" is usually understood to mean horizontal product 
differentiation, and this will be understood here until vertical product 
differentiation is explicitly discussed a t  a later stage. 
4.1 Horizontal product differentiation 
A fruitful approach to horizontal product differentiation is that products 
are considered to be amalgamations of more basic characteristics ( Lancaster, 
1979). In the simplest case, an amalgamation is just a mixture of these 
characteristics. Analysis proceeds on the assumption that consumers' 
preferences are defined in terms of these characteristics, rather than the 
products themselves. A product innovation is then the creation of a product 
with a new combination of characteristics. 
The form of industrial organisation within which product differentiation is 
usually discussed is monopolistic competition. The current theory of 
monopolistic competition brings together two strands which originated in the 
seminal works of Hotelling and Chamberlin in 1929 and 1933 respectively 
(Lancaster, 1979). In the Hotelling model the products of the competing 
firms are differentiated solely by their location along a line (a  road), and 
consumers' preferences for these products are simply ordered by the cost of 
transport. With simple and arbitrary assumptions about the density of 
consumer demand by location (uniform), and about the cost of producing a t  
different locations (no costs of relocation), Hotelling argued that in a 
duopoly industry the two firms would be located together "back to back", 
with each taking half of the market - whereas the socially optimal location, 
which minimises transport costs, would be at the quartile points along the 
road. It can be seen therefore that monopolistic competition and product 
differentiation raise problems of both a positive and normative kind. 
The tendency in the Hotelling model for firms to cluster in the 
specification of their products is at variance with a precept derived from 
Chamberlin's model, namely that firms will attempt to differentiate their 
products from each other in order to decrease the elasticity of demand that 
they face for their output. The clustering prediction persists with different 
(exogenous) numbers of firms in the industry, and with higher dimensional 
preference spaces (Lerner and Singer, 1937; Eaton and Lipsey, 1975), though 
it apparently depends on the finiteness of the product characteristics space, 
because in models in which preferences are distributed round a circle rather 
than along a finite line the prediction is that firms will be evenly spaced 
out. Another peculiarity of the Hotelling model is the fact that a given 
number of firms serving the market was assumed from the outset, whereas in 
the absence of nonconvexities in production, and assuming that firms can join 
or leave the industry freely, a competitive equilibrium will entail production 
of goods covering the complete spectrum of preferences, like haircuts. Thus 
the cause of finite product variety in competitive markets is to be found in 
production nonconvexities - economies of scale. 
Chamberlin, in contrast to Hotelling, assumed the existence of economies 
of scale and allowed the number of firms in the industry to be endogenous. 
However, Chamberlin's analysis does not involve explicit modelling of the 
ways in which products are differentiated. Nevertheless, an implication of 
the Chamberlin model is that product variety is limited by the rate at which 
average cost declines with output (though the discussion about the supposed 
welfare implications of this in terms of "excess capacity" has been largely 
erroneous - see Spence, 1976a and Lancaster). Declining average costs may 
arise for a variety of reasons, but the simplest case is that in which some 
fixed cost, like research and development or marketing or advertising or 
design, is involved. 
If it is assumed that the creation of a new product variety (relocation) is 
itself costly, but there is otherwise free entry to the industry, then firms 
will necessarily apply some foresight to their location decisions. Each firm 
contemplating entry into the market in such circumstances would consider 
how other rational firms, not unlike itself, would react to its own decisions: 
"No firm mistakenly considers itself a profit maximiser in a world of fools" 
(Prescott and Visscher, 1977). Clustering of products will not be observed in 
this case. Rather, firms will aim for gaps in the existing product spectrum. 
This leads firms to locate themselves in the space of product characteristics 
in such a way as to leave an insufficient gap in the market to make entry 
by other firms profitable. I f  they succeed in so doing then they can 
maintain a non-zero profit even in the absence of any barrier to entry 
(Prescott and Visscher op. cit., Lane 1979). 
Hence the extent of product variety, and the profitability of firms, are 
determined by the structure of costs - and not by the ferocity or the 
mildness of price competition. Consider the position of a potential entrant 
into the market. It is seeking gaps in the product spectrum, compared to 
the distribution of consumers' preferences in the space of product 
characteristics. But these gaps do not depend on the prices that the present 
incumbents are charging. If the firm actually entered the market with a 
particular product specification, all its neighouring competitors would adjust 
their prices to make the best of the new situation. Hence, an attempt to 
deter entry by means of a threat to engage in a price war will be seen by 
all rational firms - incumbents and new entrants alike - as an empty threat. 
The problem with prices in this regard is that they are reversible, and known 
to be so. The only credible threat or deterrent to new entry is an 
insufficiently sized gap to make entry profitable at whatever prices might 
ensue. The reason for this is that, unlike a price decision, a product 
specification decision involves the commitment of a fixed cost which is 
irreversible - a sunk cost. 
Firms with differentiated products compete, therefore, in two stages. 
First, they choose whether or not to enter the industry with some particular 
product specification. Secondly, with a given constellation of products on 
offer to the market, firms choose the prices of their products to maximise 
profit, and their optimal prices will be locally interdependent. That is to 
say, each firm's prices depend, among other things, on the prices set by 
other firms producing neighbouring products in the product characteristics 
space. Strategic considerations are of importance in the first of these two 
stages. It is claimed that it is at this stage that firms in some oligopolistic 
industries engage in "product proliferation1' as a means of deterring entry and 
extracting surplus profit from their range of products (Hay, 1976; 
Schmalensee, 1978 1. 
The importance of declining average costs has been emphasised in the 
foregoing, and the fact that this may be due to the presence of fixed costs. 
Fixed costs, of which a part are design costs, are therefore of particular 
importance in the theory of monopolistic competition. Fixed costs "..restrict 
the number and variety of products that it is feasible or desirable to supply, 
and therefore force an economy to choose from the large set of all 
conceivable products" (Spence, 1976b). The question is: how good is the 
choice generated by the market? In the market the set of products is 
determined by profitability, which is part of the total surplus. By contrast, 
in the social optimum it is the total surplus which is maximised, which means 
consumers1 surplus in addition to profits. Compared to this, the market 
criterion of profitability gives rise to a bias in the selection of goods made 
available. The bias works against certain kinds of products, which have been 
characterised as "special interest products". These are products for which 
there is a wide disparity in consumers' valuations, which is to say that these 
products have steeply sloped demand curves. The problem is that firms, 
being unable to price discriminate, are not able to appropriate enough of the 
surplus to cover the fixed costs of making the product available. Thus 
consumers with eccentric tastes are driven to conform by consuming the 
standard product or refraining altogether from this type of consumption, 
unless some non-market mechanism can be found to supply the goods, such as 
clubs or cooperatives. 
4.2 Vertical product differentiation 
A s  was mentioned above, vertical product differentiation concerns products 
that are differentiated by quality, where quality differences are defined in 
terms of consumer preferences between pairs of products at a common price. 
I f  product A is of superior quality to product B, and they are offered a t  the 
same price, then all consumers would choose A over B. In a remarkable 
series of recent papers it has been demonstrated that the equilibrium 
configuration of industries characterised by vertical differentiation can vary 
between a highly fragmented industry and a highly concentrated industry, 
depending on how the generation of perceived quality differences impinges on 
fixed and variable costs (Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983, and Sutton, 1986). 
I f  t h e  burden of creating higher qualities falls mainly on variable cos ts ,  then 
a fragmented industry providing a spectrum o f  product qualities can be 
expected .  But if higher qualities require expenditures on f ixed cos ts ,  there  
may be an upper limit on  t h e  number of firms producing dist inct  product 
qualities tha t  can survive a t  equilibrium. This has led the authors to 
describe the industries characterized by such technological conditions as 
"natural oligopolies". 
4.3 Multi-product firms 
Much of economic theory assumes that firms produce a single product. 
This applies in particular to the theories of monopolistically competitive firms 
in which product specification is central to the analysis. However, as was 
pointed out in Section 2, the firms in the clothing industry typically produce 
a range of products, and when we come to consider new technology, it is the 
essence of flexible automation that it concerns the set of products that a 
firm can produce. Hence the need to consider firms as multi-product 
entities. One of the analytical difficulties that multi-product firms present is 
the interactions between products which affect both costs and revenues. If 
there were no such interactions the firm could be analysed as a simple 
aggregation of its various product lines, and in effect nothing would be lost 
by considering single product firms in such a context. Let us consider the 
implications of demand and supply interactions separately, beginning with the 
former. 
Because a multi-product firm takes the demand interactions between its 
products into account in deciding what set of products to bring to the 
market, its selection of products will be interestingly different from that 
produced by a collection of single-product firms in monopolistic competition 
(Spence, 1976a,b). The introduction of a new product affects the profits 
that can be earned from other products - it reduces those profits if the 
products are substitutes, and increases them if they are complements. A 
single-product firm contemplating entry into the market with a new product 
will be oblivious, or at least unconcerned about these effects on the profits 
of other firms. If the product is a substitute for some existing products on 
the market, the demands for these existing products are reduced, diminishing 
both the profits earned on them and their consumers' surpluses. But since 
these effects are ignored, there is a presumption that too many substitute 
products will be produced by single-product firms. At the same time, there 
will be a tendency to undersupply complementary products, because for such 
goods the external effects which are ignored are positive. By contrast, when 
the goods are supplied by multi-product firms the effects are internalised, at 
least as far as the effects on profits are concerned, and both the 
overcrowding of substitutes and the undersupply of complements are 
diminished. The market will, of course, have a mechanism by which this 
preferred position may be approached: a tendency for firms that produce 
strongly interacting products to merge, creating a market composed of multi- 
product firms. 
The fact that multi-product firms take the whole set of products into 
consideration when deciding whether to introduce a new product may not, 
however, be entirely for the good. A problem arises because firms in this 
context can have the power to impede the entry of competitors by a 
judicious positioning of their products in the space of product characteristics, 
as discussed in Section 4.1. This can occur when a sunk cost is incurred in 
establishing the position, and the manner in which it is achieved is by 
ensuring that there is no gap within the range of the firm's products that 
would yield profits to the new entrant sufficient to cover the sunk cost. (Of 
course, the new entrant could be an established firm whose current domain is 
elsewhere in the characteristics space. ) 
Obviously, it is necessary for the incumbent firm to have a contiguous 
range of products in the characteristics space in order to be able to employ 
this strategy of preemptive product creation, and the likelihood that a firm 
could set up and maintain such a contiguous range of products diminishes 
with the dimensionality of the relevant characteristics space - though see 
Schmalensee (1978) for an important case involving at least four 
characteristics. With a contiguous range of products, the firm's ability to 
extract profit from its products varies with their position with respect to 
outside products. On the periphery of its domain, profitability will be set by 
the intensity of competition, and boundary products will be the least 
profitable, while within the domain profitability will be greater, being 
determined by the size of the fixed sunk costs involved in positioning the 
product. The implication here that incumbent firms with established products 
can maintain a profitable position by "crowding out" latecomers is an example 
of a more general phenomenon of "first mover advantage", which often arises 
in models involving product differentiation and technical change. 
Turning now to supply side interactions, the effects of producing a 
particular product on the cost of producing other products may be referred 
to as 'interproduct economies' (Lancaster op. cit.) or as 'economies of scope' 
(Panzar and Willig, 1981). We shall restrict attention to the important case 
in which these interactions are generally positive, ie. where costs are 
lowered or at most unaffected for all products produced by the firm, and 
where it is the fixed costs of producing the various products that are 
affected. In this case the effect of such economies of scope is on the set 
of products that the firm produces, and not on the output level of any 
particular product, given that it is to be produced. The reason for this is 
that variations in fixed costs do not affect profit maximising output levels, 
because they leave the equalities between marginal costs and marginal 
revenue unaffected. But such variations do affect the level of profit on 
each (potential) product, and the decision whether or not to introduce a 
product turns only on the question whether the increment in profit arising 
from its introduction would be positive. But note that it is total profit that 
matters, so it is conceivable that a product would be introduced even though 
it could not cover its total costs, so long as the shortfall was less than the 
amount by which the costs of the firm's other products were reduced. There 
will therefore be a tendency for multi-product firms enjoying such economies 
of scope to introduce both a wider range and a denser spacing of products 
than would a set of single product companies utilising an equivalent amount 
of resources. To the extent that products are substitutes, this is a force on 
the supply side offsetting the conclusion above that a wider spacing of 
products comes about when demand interactions are taken into account by 
multi-product firms. 
An implication of the foregoing is that a change in technology that 
enables firms to enjoy increased economies of scope in the form of diminished 
fixed costs with respect to the set of product specifications, facilitates the 
establishment of a contiguous range of products permitting long-term prof its 
to be earned which are impervious to outside competition. The multi-product 
firm in such circumstances would have an even greater first mover advantage 
than hitherto. 
4.4 Application to the clothing industry 
Product differentiation is the norm in the clothing industry. It is 
sometimes the case that clothing can be considered to be a homogeneous 
commodity, but, other than in the China of Mao Ze Deng, that mainly applies 
where it serves the purpose of a uniform. The dimensions in which clothing 
is differentiated include the following: type of garment, size, style, quality, 
colour or pattern, and material. Of these six attributes, the first two - type 
and size - reflect an element of inherent product differentiation, due to the 
fact that the market is unavoidably segmented. Even in Mao's China there 
had to be garments of various types (jackets and trousers, say) and sizes. 
But, while the demand side of the market is thus compartmentalised, it is 
interesting to note that the organisation of supply is rather different 
regarding the attributes type and size. Thus, whereas a firm's output will 
typically span a range of sizes, it is not unusual for firms to specialise in a 
very limited set of types of garment. Why this difference? It is obviously 
to do with the fact that economies of scope (inter-product economies) apply 
more strongly to size-differentiated products than to type-differentiated 
products. The same design, material buying and marketing apply to products 
differentiated only in size. Also, where the same firm produces clothing of 
different types, that too is because of economies of scope. In this case, 
however, the economies of scope are likely to arise because of interaction 
with some other attributes - thus a firm produces clothes of different type 
because they "match", or reflect some wider design concept, or use the same 
special materials. 
The essence of product differentiation among clothing producers is 
therefore in the remaining four attributes: style, quality, material and 
colour/pattern. They are of course intercorrelated, but the important point 
is that the four variables contribute in particular ways to the two 'principal 
components', namely horizontal and vertical product differentiation. Products 
are horizontally differentiated in terms of style, colour/pattern and, to some 
extent, material; whereas they are vertically differentiated by quality, 
material and, to some extent, style (in the sense of the adjective ''stylish"). 
The firm positions itself in both aspects of product differentiation by its 
design and marketing activities. 
Since there is an annual cycle for the clothing industry, with new product 
ranges appearing every season, which occurs twice or possibly four times a 
year, the firms in the industry can reposition their products in the 
characteristics space with the same frequency. Thus product locations can, 
and do, vary regularly. But within the season, product location is fixed. It 
is not feasible, given the lead time from initial design to final marketing, to 
switch designs - product locations, that is - midseason. This has led to a 
situation in which some firms stake out an early product location by 
announcing to the world what their designs for the forthcoming season will 
be. The firms that do this would be in a vulnerable position if latecomers 
could simply position their own products optimally in the characteristics space 
with regard to given positions staked out by the leaders. But there is 
another dimension to it, namely the design leaders are actually defining the 
appropriate characteristics space - by determining what is fashionable. In 
this way, the leaders' designs become the standard by which others' products 
are judged, and consumers would always prefer clothes with a "designer label" 
over some anonymous design, ceteris paribus. Thus high fashion design is 
tantamount to vertical product differentiation. With this interpretation it is 
possible to explain the oligopolistic structure of the "top end" of the fashion 
clothing market. The key is in the costs required to position a firm at the 
top end of such a vertically differentiated market. The creation of quality 
in this sense falls mainly on fixed costs - design and marketing, including the 
expensive shows and publicity. Of course the clothes themselves are 
typically hand-made and use expensive materials, which imply higher variable 
costs. But it is the relative importance o f  fixed costs in the production of  
quality which tends to make the market oligopolistic. For comparison 
consider the top end of the men's non-fashion clothing market, which is 
traditionally one of bespoke tailors. Here the creation of quality falls mainly 
on variable costs - labour and materials - and the market is quite highly 
fragmented, which is as the theory predicts (Sutton, 1986). 
However, the ostentatiously visible top end of the clothing market is 
rather atypical of the industry as a whole. Design matters for the bulk of 
the industry, not as a device for vertical product differentiation, but for 
horizontal product differentiation. I t  still involves the incurring of costs 
which are both fixed and sunk. These cost attributes are, in other contexts, 
a possible source of local monopoly power because they encourage 
competitors to distance themselves from an established firm. However, with 
an annual cycle of new product specification, no firm in the clothing industry 
is necessarily committed to a particular position in the product 
characteristics space for the following season. The only way a f irm can get 
established or be considered as an incumbent is by creating a "design imagen 
that is consistent over a period of several seasons. That is one strategy 
that a firm can adopt - such firms might be considered "leaders" in the 
design game. They do, however, face a risk that fashion has moved demand 
away from their chosen location. Another strategy is to wait until the last 
possible moment, when the uncertainty about demand might be somewhat 
diminished, and to position the firm's products accordingly. Since firms 
adopting the latter strategy are necessarily delaying their design decisions, 
they may be considered "followers". But they are far from passive in this 
role; rather, their strategy is aggressive and rests on their ability to move 
quickly to areas of high demand. 
Whether leaders or followers, all firms have an incentive to discover how 
their competitors plan to position their products - their design intentions in 
other words. This of course presents designing firms with a problem because 
design, being a form of information, has the same public goods properties 
that other kinds of information share. In the clothing industry the only 
effective ways to appropriate the value of design work are either to keep it 
secret until it can no longer be of use to the competition, or to make it 
specific to the firm by linking it to a distinctive image, possibly through 
advertising. 
5. The implications of changing technology 
The changes in technology outlined in section 2.2 and elsewhere above 
have a number of implications for the firms in the clothing industry, and for 
the industry as a whole. The new technology simultaneously offers several 
changes: it makes possible the substitution of capital for labour, and hence 
has implications for the industry's demands for factors of production; it 
enables manufacturers to produce a far greater range of products, and to 
switch between them in a flexible manner; it shortens the whole process from 
initial conception of a design to its final sale to the customer; and it allows 
feedback from the final consumers to the initial design stage, so that 
modifications can be brought about within a season. These changes will 
impinge heavily, not only on the organisational structure of the firms, but 
even more importantly on the structure of the industry and the nature of 
competition in the industry. 
Firms which innovate by adopting the new technologies will have a much 
greater integration of  the design, production and marketing functions than 
hitherto. These functions have, up to now, been separable. For example, it 
has sometimes made commercial sense to do the designing in Europe and 
subcontract the production activities to low wage countries. The logic of 
the new technologies, however, is to bind the stages of production, from the 
initial conception of the product to its final destination with the customer, 
together. It is, therefore, evident that, in addition to requiring a substantial 
investment commitment, such innovation will have a considerable impact on 
the structure and working practices of the adopting firms. In fact, in 
adopting the new technology the firm will also need to make substantial 
organisational and managerial innovations. It is quite possible that these 
concomitant changes to working practices, hierarchical structures, location of 
production, and so on will be the deciding factors as to which firms will be 
early adopters and which will delay. The new technology also has 
implications for the strategies that are open to the firm, and hence for the 
competitive environment that firms are likely to find themselves in - these 
are discussed in more detail below. 
The international location of the industry will be quite strongly influenced 
by the advent of the new technology, because of its impact on comparative 
advantage. With the forward integration from design to marking, grading and 
sewing, the variable cost of a given batch of clothes produced to a new 
design should be less than would have been the case with the traditional 
technology. The saving of variable factor inputs, which are mainly labour 
costs, will encourage firms in the high-wage countries to innovate with the 
new technology. It is in these countries that the labour force is most highly 
educated, and hence most likely to supply the necessary new skills for the 
new technology. Thus the incentive to innovate should be greatest for the 
firms which still carry out the bulk of  their productive activities in the high 
wage countries. Firms which have subcontracted their production activities 
to low wage countries have a double obstacle to innovation: the savings in 
production costs will not appear so large to them, and the necessary 
reorganisation of their activities will be more costly to them. 
At the design end of the production process, the new technologies should 
entail a substantial decrease in the marginal cost of a new design. The 
reduced cost of new designs should lead to a much greater proliferation of 
designs - probably in the sense of more variations on the basic theme which 
is currently in fashion. There will be a tendency towards custom-made 
clothing, and there should also be a greater availability of speciality 
clothing as the fixed costs attributable to such products will have been 
diminished. This greater product variety will be created in a smaller number 
of firms than hitherto because to achieve the economies of scope that the 
new technology makes possible will require a substantial investment in plant 
and equipment. These larger fixed costs imply a greater range of declining 
average costs and hence a larger minimum efficient scale for the firms in the 
industry once the new technology is established. Consumers can benefit from 
a reorganisation of production into larger multi-product firms: such producers 
take more account of interactions between the demands for different 
products, and are therefore more willing to supply complementary products. 
Despite a tendency for fewer firms to populate the industry, each 
producing a greater range of products, it cannot yet be inferred that 
competitive pressure between firms will be thereby diminished. Although the 
considerable investment required to realise the greatly enhanced overall 
economies of scope means a commitment of fixed costs, the costs relevant to 
the positioning of a particular product in the characteristics space will be 
much less than before, even though such costs may be described as "sunk" - 
that is, specific to the product. Hence the ability to use sunk costs to 
crowd out the competition will be correspondingly reduced. In these 
circumstances product proliferation by "incumbents" will not be a viable 
strategy to fend off the opposition and maintain profits. Instead, all the 
conceivable product niches will have become "contestable" (see Baumol et al, 
1982). This contestability of the various product niches places a premium on 
the ability to move quickly so as to "steal a march" on the opposition. 
The capacity to produce a new range of clothes quickly will be one of 
the characteristics of the new technology. The firms that innovate first will 
therefore be in an advantageous position in the industry. However, it was 
argued above that the innovators are likely to be firms whose production 
takes place in high wage countries, because the new technology offers them 
the greatest savings in cost. These firms have in the past typically been the 
design leaders, and have extracted quasi-rents on the basis of their design 
work. By contrast, firms which are either based in the low-wage countries, 
or which have subcontracted production to those countries, have been the 
price-competitive design followers. It is the latter which have the 
experience, organisation and management style that would most benefit from 
the advantages of speed and flexibility. Hence, it could be counter-argued 
that these may be in the vanguard of innovation. In the face of such 
conflicting possibilities, it is perhaps reasonable to predict that the 
complementary synergies between firms of these two broad types may 
encourage pairs of them to combine so as to extract the most profit from 
innovation. 
In the long run, the industry will have adapted to the new technology, 
and firms will be competing on the same footing. The industry will be 
composed of larger firms, each producing a greater variety of products. As 
was argued above, the logic of the technology makes even more competitive 
behaviour likely, despite the more oligopolistic structure of the industry. In 
addition, the technology may have consequences for the behaviour of the 
industry at the macro level. The greater integration of the industry and the 
increased flexibility of production will enable producers to get feedback from 
the market place within the season, and thereby to correct previous errors. 
Producers will have the ability to modify designs, to increase the production 
of popular models and to switch production away from designs that are not 
profitable. This points to a much diminished reliance on inventories compared 
to the present situation, and a consequently reduced exposure to market risk. 
The adaptability of production with the new technology should further reduce 
the importance of pre-season buying by retailers, and their end-of-season 
sales at reduced prices. So retailers, as well as producers, should face 
lessened demand risk and consequent output price variability. Moreover, the 
lessened dependence on inventories in the system could point to a radically 
different channelling of supply to the market, with much less reliance than 
hitherto on wholesaling services. Furthermore, it is possible that the reduced 
need for stocks may attenuate the conjunctural cycle of the clothing 
industry. 
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